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Introduction
1 The seminal paper of Coase (1937) on ‘the Nature of the Firm’  has been mainly used by
economists to explain the elements that define the boundaries of  the capitalist  firm.
Coase  makes  a  distinction  between  two  coordinating  mechanisms,  namely  the
entrepreneur’s  authority  and  the  price  system.  Thus,  he  proposes  to  confront  the
economic definition he makes with the legal definition of the firm. According to him, ‘it is
all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word firm should be given
but that its difference from a firm in the real world, if it exists, should be made clear’ (
ibid.: 386). To sum up, a definition of a firm that is realistic in that it corresponds to what
is meant by a firm in the real world should be determined. To achieve such an objective,
the  1991  Nobel  laureate  Coase  analyzed  the  employment  relationship  from  both  an
economic and legal point of view. Notably, he focuses on the legal realism of his definition
of the capitalist firm. At the end of the article, Coase explains that ‘we can best approach
the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship
normally called that of master and servant or employer and employee’ (ibid.: 403). For
him, the economic definition of the firm he proposes – i.e. the entrepreneur-co-ordinator
who directs production – matches very well with the legal one; he notes that ‘we thus see
that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of employer and
employee just as it was in the economic concept’ (ibid.: 404).
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2 Coase finally considers that the definition of the firm he gives is close to the firm as it is
considered  in  the  real-world,  which  means  that  the  boundaries  of  the  firm  are
determined  by  the  employment  relationship.  However,  despite  numerous  economic
works on capitalist firm’s functioning rules, only a few studies have clearly taken into
account the legal and institutional contexts of the employer-employee relationship and
established a theoretical link between this ‘real-world fact’ and the nature of the firm. By
and large, economic theories have traditionally neglected the legal nature of the firm.1
3 In this paper, we analyze the way contract theories (of American origin) consider the
American institutional environment in order to study the firm and its legal basis, namely,
the employment relationship (see Masten 1988).
4 Among the heterogeneous works composing this mainstream research field, we selected
three main theories that rely, at least in part, on law and legal theories. These three
mainstream theories – generally called ‘contract theories’ – consist in: (1) the transaction
cost economics2 (TCE; e.g., Williamson 1975, 1985, 1991, 2005); (2) the nexus of contracts
theory3 (NCT; e.g.,  Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976);  and (3) the
modern theory of property rights4 (MTPR; e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart et Moore
1990; Hart 1995; Hart and Holmström 2010).  These three theories do not constitute a
homogeneous theoretical set and must be distinguished from each other (for a survey on
these theories  see  Gibbons,  2005;  Garrouste  and Saussier  2005;  Foss  and Klein 2008).
Nevertheless,  TCE  and  MTPR  represent  the  two  main  incomplete  contract  theories,
whereas  NCT  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  complete  and  ‘explicit’  contracts.  This
difference  is  important  because  the  firm  as  institution  only  matters  in  a  world  of
incomplete contracts (Williamson 1985).
5 Labor  law  is  shaped  by  juridical  culture,  which  is  specific  to  certain  national  legal
traditions. The real world is characterized by distinct conceptions of the employment
relationship that took shape in different national systems and that reflect variations in
economic  conditions  and  legal  cultures.  Thus,  we  think  it  is  important  not  only  to
question the relevance of these theories regarding the American law, but also to analyze
these theories in the context of other institutional environments. In this comparative
view,  we  consider  the  French  law  to  be  very  interesting,  because  the  French  legal
structure strongly differs from the American legal structure. In contrast to the French
labor  law,  the  American  labor  law is  more  intrinsic  to  the  firm (Stone  1981,  2009).
Arguably,  the  notion  that  the  firm  is  considered  as  an  autonomous  legal  entity  is
important  here.  This  normative  autonomy  relegates  other  sources  of  law  such  as
legislators, judges and law courts to the background, whereas we will show that in France
these constitute the main sources of (positive) law.
6 French labor law is characterized by both social public order and employees’ protection
(in order to restore ‘the balance of power’), whereas American labor law rests on the
‘balancing of power’ by actors themselves. In France, the balancing of power between
employer and employees is the concern of the State, which implements specific rules and
regulations.  In other  words,  even  though  working  relationships  are  considered  as
contractual relations of private law, they are subjected to public-order rules intended to
protect the weaker party of the contract. According to Supiot (2007), the combination of
contractual base and interventionist legislation better defines the ‘French model’. In this
perspective,  we  see  a  significant  gap  between  the  American  model  of  working
relationships and the French one. The former can be appreciated as an economic model
whereas the latter is linked to a political conception of working relationships. However,
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the contract-based theory does not  show this  political  dimension of  the firm.  Supiot
(2007) rightly attributes these differences to distinct national models of labor law. The
emergence of collective agreements can be based either on public regulations (the French
model)  or  on  collective  autonomy (The  US  model).  Labor  law is  shaped by  juridical
culture,  which  is  specific  to  certain  national  legal  traditions.  It  appears  thus  that
differences in legal culture result in rules that are substantially different across legal
national systems.
7 The issue of employment regulation thus raises the question of the relationship between
economic  analysis  and  the  national  legal  environment.  The  application  of  economic
theory to the regulation of employment relationship is necessary to provide positive and
normative  analyses  (Dau-Schmidt,  Harris  and  Lobel  2009).  More  specifically,  three
questions should be addressed for contract economic theories: (1) what place is given to
positive legal rules in the analysis of the employment relationship (positive view), (2) how
are  these  rules perceived  by mainstream  economists  from  an  efficiency  perspective
(normative view) and (3)  in which way can these approaches to the firm ‘portray’  a
specific  labor  law developed  in  European  institutional  contexts,  notably,  the  French
context? These questions appear to be very salient notably because recent changes in
employment practice seem to make contract economic theories outdated.
8 To  answer  these  three  questions,  we  will  first  analyze  the  links  between  contract
economic theories and the American legal structure of the employment relationship. We
show that from a positive point of view, these theories are based more or less explicitly
on the American law tradition. In addition, the different contract theories of the firm are
not  homogeneous,  but  are  complementary.  We  will  then  compare  the  normative
conclusions of contract approaches to the firm with the French labor law. We argue that
if  a  certain  compatibility  condition  exists  regarding  some  sources  of  law,  a  major
inconsistency is produced in France by the importance of the role of the State and of the
judges’ actions.
 
1. The close relationship between contract economic
theories and labor law in the United States
9 In American labor law, the elaboration of workplace rules proceeds whether or not the
firm concludes a collective agreement (Stone 2009).5 This distinction is crucial because
there are two distinct branches of  the American labor regulation,  namely,  labor law,
which provides the mechanism for collective bargaining and other forms of employee
collectives,  and  employment  law,  which  sets  minimal  employment  standards  for  all
employees.6 We will show that the MTPR and the NCT on the one hand and the TCT on the
other hand are de facto theories that propose analyzes which are anchored in this the
legal context. Thus Williamson by studying the firm and the employment relationship in
his two books of 1975 and 1985 explicitly analyzes the organized firm. On the contrary, in
their analysis of the employment relationship MPRT and NCT theorists, deal with the
inter-individual relations of work specific to the unorganized firm.
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1.1. Labor law and the ‘organized firm’ in transaction cost
economics: the central role of collective relationships
10 The  collectively  organized  firm  is  in  line with  the  system  referred  to  as  industrial
pluralism,  according to  which the collective  aspect  of  labor  relations  and laws must
overshadow the individual aspects.7 Two stages should be distinguished. The first stage
consists of determining the structure in which the collective negotiation,  that is,  the
appropriate bargaining unit that constitutes the second stage, takes place. Although it
can be  an establishment,  a  profession,  or  units  grouping several  firms together,  the
selected unit for collective bargaining is often the firm or a sub-unit, such as a plant or a
division. Furthermore, it is in this legal structure that the employees’ rights are organized
and exercised (see Morin 2005). These rights rest on an absolute majority vote and are
represented by a trade union with the employer. If the majority of employees accepts a
specific trade union, it becomes the exclusive representative of all employees composing
the unit.
11 The  collective  negotiation  process  results  in  a  conventional  law  that  governs  labor
relationships in the firm at two levels. The first level is based on all the aspects of the
employment relationship,  such as  wages,  qualifications,  job schedules  and job safety,
among others. The second consists of administrative agreements, notably those related to
individual and collective disputes. This grievance procedure constitutes a substitute to
legal action in that the parties themselves try to resolve disputes and conflicts before
having  recourse  to  a  third  entity.  Arbitration,  which  is  often  included  in  collective
conventions,8 plays a central role in settling disputes in the sense that it is the parties
that choose the arbitrator, pay him, determine his competence and set the procedures he
must follow. Conflicts are internal to the firm, which allows to avoid recourse to judges
and courts.  As  a  consequence,  the  autonomy of  the firm regarding both negotiation
procedure and settlement of disputes is complete (Williamson 2002).
12 The employment relationship has not  been substantially  investigated in the contract
economic theories of the firm. In this regard, the early works of Williamson constitute an
exception (the role of the employment relationship became less important when in the
1980’s-1990’s he decided to give more importance to the ‘contractual men’). In his 1975
and 1985 books, the analysis of the employment relationship proposed by Williamson is
clearly linked to the idea of the collectively organized firm. In ‘Markets and Hierarchies:
Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications’,  he defined the firm as a collective organization
that is different (by nature) from the market and is characterized by an employer (who
holds  authority),  a  workforce  and  a  productive  activity.  By  working  for  a  firm,  an
employee accepts a whole system of rules,  which he does not necessarily agree with,
because these rules are not negotiated in a bilateral way (i.e., between an employer and
an employee). On the contrary, these rules are provided by the collective nature of the
firm. In fact, these rules result from the internal labor market (see Doeringer and Piore
1971). This market is at the heart of the employment relationship. In addition, Williamson
gives unions a fundamental role by arguing that internal labor market agreements are
made through collective negotiations and by defending the thesis according to which
unions  are more  efficient  as  mediators  in  dispute  settlements  (see  infra),  and  this
argument strengthens the collective dimension of the firm.
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13 In  his  1985  book,  Williamson  uses  several  arguments  developed  by  American  labor
lawyers representing the industrial pluralism who consider the firm as an ‘island of self-
rules’ (see Stone 1981, 1992). More specifically, according to Williamson (1991, 2002), the
firm is  a  private  normative  ordering  considered  as  both  a  hierarchical  governance9
structure and a private contractual arrangement. This approach to the firm as a private
ordering  is  opposed  to  an  other  legal  tradition,  namely,  legal  centralism  (see  also
Gallanter 1981 on this point).
14 Finally, the employment relationship theorized by Williamson appears to be in line with
the description of the collectively organized firm. However, the percentage of employees
working in collective organized firms is very low (about 15 % for US). Additionally, he also
considers that the employment at will  supports the doctrine of forbearance based on
private ordering. However, collectively organized firms and firms with employment at
will are significantly different and belong to mutually exclusive categories. Thus, it is
essential  to  analyze  and  investigate  the  widespread  case  of  the  ‘non-collectively
organized firm’.
 
1.2. Employment law and the ‘non-organized firm’ in NCT and MPRT:
the primacy of contractual freedom and individual relationships
15 Without collective relations in the workplace (i.e., when the workforce is not organized in
a collective entity represented by a trade union),  the non-organized firm is  the sole
center of individual labor relations (employment law), which rest on the employment
contracts between an employer and the employees of  the firm he governs.  Based on
property rights and contractual freedom, the power of the employer, which can thus be
freely exerted, consists of two powers: a normative power and a commanding power.
16 The normative power is related to labor law and employee handbooks. In the United
States, the employment contract is the agreement (contract) between an employer and an
employee through which the terms and conditions of employment are defined (Stone
2009). Beyond this general definition, it is essential to dissociate again ‘organized firms’
and ‘non-organized firms’. In the former, employer and employee cannot be contractually
shielded from the obligatory force of the collective convention. In other words, statutes
take the place of contracts. In the latter, the agreement terms depend largely on the
power relationships between employer and employee. Nevertheless, in both cases, the
contract implies an obligation of obedience, loyalty and respect for an employee. For
example,  the  employee  must  act  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  entity  (the  firm).
Interestingly,  Masten (1988)  explains  that,  when an individual  accepts  entry  into  an
employment relationship, he accepts a tacit obligation that consists of complying with all
of the rules, orders and reasonable instructions emanating from the employer. Masten
identified the aspects of authority distinguishing a firm from the market by comparing
employment law and commercial contract law. He investigated whether an employer’s
rights  or  authority  might  be  replicated  in  commercial  contracts.  The  law  does  not
consistently  treat  commercial  transactions  and  employment  relationships:  ‘the
investigation  reveals  that  the  law  does  in  fact  recognize  substantial  differences  in
obligations, sanctions and procedures governing the two types of exchange’ (ibid., 196).
The courts establish the nature of  a particular economic relationship based on these
criteria. Masten concluded that ‘the traditional emphasis in economics on the authority
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of management to direct the efforts of employees is at least nominally supported by the
law governing employment transactions’ (ibid.: 186).
17 It  is  also  important  to  underline  that  the  employment  contract  itself  does  not  fully
prejudge  the  type  of  relations  engaged  –  an  employee/employer  relationship  or  an
independent contractor relationship – in the sense that the parties cannot by contract
alone determine it. Legislators and judges can legally qualify the situation according to
the ‘salient facts’ and to the abusive contract terms. Therefore, the notion of the contract
appears to be ‘confused’ in the United States. The employee is hence defined as ‘a person
who works in the service of another person under an express or implied contract of hire,
under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance’ (in
Black’s Law Dictionary).10 The right to control tests constitutes a criterion used by judges
for  observing the  power  of  the  employer.  Judges  also  use  the  criterion of  economic
dependence to observe this top-down form of power. In the case of American courts,
authority in the employment relationship and the control associated with it are based on
both the outcome of work and the way in which the work is conducted. In contrast – and
this is a fundamental difference – in a commercial transaction, control cannot be based
on the outcome of work (Masten 1988).11
18 Thus, when work conditions are not specified in the contract, they are written in the
employee handbook, which is distributed at the time of hiring and discusses all questions
of discipline, dismissal and salaries, among others (Blanc-Jouvan 2005). In other words,
the employee handbook defines all the norms that come under the organized firm of the
collective negotiation and constitutes the ‘law of the firm’, that is, the normative rules of
the intra-firm game. The commanding power consists of making all decisions linked to
the  work  of  employees,  and its  main  expression is  found in  the  so-called  theory  of
‘employment at will’.  According to this theory,  the employer maintains the ability to
dissolve the individual employment relationship at any time without explanation12 when
it is with unlimited duration. Therefore, without collective conventions and trade unions,
the employer has full freedom in the use of the workforce. Stone (2004) explains that ‘the
bulk of American nonunion workers remained subject to the at-will doctrine and basically
unprotected for their job-related grievances’ (2004: 123).
19 How do contract economists influenced by American doctrine include this employment
law of the non-organized firm?
20 First, it is essential to note that NCT and MTPR do not make reference to the labor law
based on the collectively organized firm. Therefore, the only possible connection between
economics and law relates to the non-organized firm. However, in the United States (in
contrast to France), the work relationship has been understood since the 19th century to
be ordinary merchandise by law. In the United States, the dominant form of employment
contract is at will; ‘the doctrine at will says that an employment contract of indefinite
duration can be terminated by either party at any time for any reason’ (Stone 2007: 84).
The work relationship currently remains ‘an ordinary object’ for the law. For American
lawyers, work is thus the object of a simple economic exchange. Furthermore, the at-will
rule is a de jure employment contract, but implicit contracts for job security seem to be
the norm for most workers.  In this view, it  becomes clear that the outsiders remain
subject to the unmediated at-will rule, lacking job security and job-related benefits (ibid.).
21 The NCT appears to belong to the at-will doctrine. The canonical paper of Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), which prefigures the NCT, can be reread in this perspective. Indeed, these
two economists treat the employment relationship as a simple trading relationship (such
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as a relationship between a grocer and his customers). For them, in the same way that a
manager gives order to his secretary to type a specific letter, a customer gives his grocer
the order to sell him a specific brand of tuna. A passage of the paper of Alchian and
Demsetz shows the close relationship between the NCT and the at-will doctrine:
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by
authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional
market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of
fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from
ordinary market contracting between any two people.  I  can punish you only by
withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to
honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any employer can do. He
can fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him or sue
him  for  delivering  faulty  products.  […].  To  speak  of  managing,  directing,  or
assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive way of noting that the employer
continually  is  involved  in  renegotiation  of  contracts  on  terms  that  must  be
acceptable to both parties. […]. I have no contract to continue to purchase from the
grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual
obligations to continue their relationship (ibid.: 777).
22 The  contractual  freedom  of  individuals  completes  the  pure  economic  exchange:
employers and employees are free to define the terms of the economic exchange in the
view of the NCT. There is no authority in the firm but only different forms of market
power. The at-will theory constitutes a strong application of this contractual freedom.
From this point of view, we can also see the specificity of modern property rights theory
in the analysis of the nature of authority.
23 Following Alchian and Demsetz, Hart (1995) raises the question of the origins of authority
without considering the legal specificity of the employment contract. Contrary to the TCE
(and to the work of Masten, 1988), the MTPR argues that a firm can also give orders to
another firm. Therefore, the interesting question for this theory is why an employee pays
attention, whereas an independent contractor does not. To answer this question, Hart
(1995: 58) affirms that ‘in the former case, if the relationship breaks down, the employer
walks away with all the nonhuman assets, whereas in the latter case, each independent
contractor walks away with some nonhuman assets. This difference gives the employer
leverage. Individual i is more likely to do what individual j wants, if j can exclude i from
assets  that  i  needs  to  be  productive.  This  theory defines  the  firm as  a  collection of
nonhuman assets such that ‘control over nonhuman assets leads to control over human
assets’ (ibid.). Why does an employee obey his employer? The answer is because the latter
can deprive the former of production assets. Consequently, the origins of authority come
from ownership; ownership is a source of power (this argument is similar to the Marxist
approach to power relationships in the capitalist firm). Authority is not linked to the
particular nature of the employment relationship, and command power is not specific to
the firm; the commanding role within a firm is not different from the commanding role
between  firms.  In  the  MTPR,  power  is  dependent  on  ownership  and  is  exclusively
dedicated  to  palliate  contractual  failures  when  contingencies  occur  (Hart  1995);  if
contracts were complete, power would not exist. This theory reduces authority to a de
jure form of power that results from the ownership (and the associated ‘residual control
rights’)  of  non-human (physical)  assets.  In other words,  according to this incomplete
contract approach, ‘control over a physical asset in this line can lead indirectly to control
over human assets’ (Hart and Moore 1990, 1121). The conception of authority proposed by
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the  MTPR  is  significantly  different  from  the  conception  of  authority  successively
proposed by Coase (1937), Simon (1951) and Williamson (1985).
24 The last argument seems to imply that employees have few alternatives to the specific
relationship between them and their employer to give value to their productive efforts.
There  is  no  symmetry  between  the  employer  and  the  employee  since  the  latter  is
economically dependent on the former. For the employer, the dependence relationship is
very different. The employer is not dependent on his employees because if the economic
relationship  is  broken,  he  does  not  lose  all  of  his  residual  income  (in  contrast  to
employees). Furthermore, the employer can also organize the production to replace the
employees with lower-cost factors of production. Therefore, the authority of employers is
indirect in MTPR because it results from the power conferred by property rights (Baudry
and  Chassagnon  2010).  In  other  words,  MTPR,  which  characterizes  the  employment
relationship from the lens of power relationships, seems to be ‘realistic’ regarding the law
of  non-organized  firms.  Indeed,  this  theory  focuses  on  the  unevenness  between
employers and employees, from which employers have the capacity to unilaterally fix the
work conditions. The MTPR sheds light on the importance of bargaining power resulting
from the ownership of capital assets in the market regulation of the relation between
employee and employer, which is indirectly a way to adhere to the at-will doctrine.
25 To  conclude  this  section,  we  have  shown  in  a  positive  point  of  view  that  contract
approaches to the firm are not ‘decontextualized’ and seem to be largely complementary.
Having said that,  we must  raise the following question:  what  judgment can contract
approaches make about labor law? In other words, it is crucial to deal with the normative
dimension of contract economic theories. To assess this, we propose to compare these
theories with the French labor law.
 
2. The Normative Conclusions of Contract Theories of
the Firm: The Unavoidable Tension with the French
Model of Labor Law
26 Despite  some  important  differences  regarding  the  recognition  of  law  in  analyses  of
employment relationship, contract economic theories are in agreement on some crucial
elements if we consider the normative consequences of their approaches in terms of labor
law. Among these elements are the uselessness of protective rules of employees in terms
of efficiency,13 the incompleteness of formal employment contracts, which give way to
relational contracts (MacNeil, 1974, 1978; Williamson, 1985; Baker, Gibbons et Murphy,
2002), the critical appreciation of the role of courts, and (notably concerning TCE) the
superiority  of  the  model  of  governance  based  on  private  ordering.  However,  these
conclusions conflict with a large part of the French labor law that tends to be based on
‘legal  pluralism’.  Indeed,  three  sources  of  law  coexist  in  France  in  terms  of  labor14
(Pélissier,  Supiot  and  Jeammaud  2006):  State  sources,  professional  sources  and
employment contracts. However, contract economic theories do not deal with the role of
the State and French law courts in the regulation of employment relationships and seem
to fail in analyzing the political dimension of the firm.
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2.1. A partial compatibility between contract economic theories and
French labor law
27 Regarding the analysis of French labor law, it appears that this law is in line with contract
economic theories on two points: (1) contractual freedom and power of the employer and
(2) collective conventions and negotiations.
 
2.1.1. Contractual freedom and employers’ power
28 In  the  United  States,  the  employment  relationship  is  mediated  by  the  employment
contract between an employer and an employee. In France, the jurisprudence defines this
contract as a convention by which a physical person signs on making herself available to
another person – physically or morally – under the subordination of whom (which) she
places in return for remuneration. From these three elements, which are indispensable
for  characterizing  an  employment  contract,  a  work  activity,  a  remuneration,  and  a
subordination relationship, it  is evident that the last one is the more important.  The
France’s Court of Cassation reaffirmed in 1996 in the ruling ‘Société Générale’  that the
employment  relationship  is  characterized  by  the  execution  of  a  work  activity  under  the
authority of an employer who has the power to give orders and directives, to control its execution
and to punish the failures of the subordinated. Consequently, any typical convention related
to  an  employment  contract  confers  to  the  employer  authority  over  his  employees.
Regarding this point of view, there are no crucial differences between the American labor
law and the French labor law15 (even though the NCT and the MTPR do not take into
account this crucial real-world fact).
29 Regarding the last argument, contract economic theories seem to propose a coherent
analytical  framework  for  studying  the  legal  contractual  aspect  of  the  employment
relationship. For example, at the moment of the conclusion of the employment contract,
there is a negotiation between the employer and the employee and an agreement on
numerous elements of the employment relationship. This negotiation process is strictly
contractual such that there are no contradictions between economists and lawyers on
this point. As Pelissier, Supiot and Jeammaud (2006) argue, the agreement governing the
employment can be assimilated to a ‘specification zone’, where the ability to expressly
determine the qualification and the remuneration of the employee, the place and other
conditions of his work, the clauses providing advantages and guarantees for the employee
(job  vehicle  and  accommodations,  experience  advantages,  clauses  of  ensuring
employment during a precise time and so on) and other specific subjections (working test
period,  clause  of  mobility,  result  clause  or  non-competition  clause)  is  stipulated.
Similarly, the contractual dimension is important when the employer decides to change
or  modify  certain employment  and work conditions.  These  changes  or  modifications
constitute a revision of the employment contract, which thus requires the agreement of
the employer.
30 If, in a contractual perspective, the employment contract seems to be an instrument of
negotiation between the different parties, we must note that it is also the first principle
for determining the work and employment conditions. From this contract, the employee
becomes the creditor of the job provision and of the work tasks corresponding to the
accepted qualification.  TCE focuses  on obedience and acceptance,  and other  contract
economic  theories  do  not  mention  this  fundamental  aspect  of  the  employment
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relationship, which suggests that the employer has an unlimited ability to fix the work
conditions. According to TCE, this acceptance zone does not result strictly from positive
law but instead results from private ordering.  In this view, Simon (1951) proposes ‘a
theory of the employment relationship’ (1951, 293) in which authority plays a central
role;  authority  is  the  nature  of  the  employment  relationship.  For  Simon (1951),  the
employment contract is strongly different from the ordinary marketing contract. Indeed,
‘W enters into an employment contract with B when the former agrees to pay the former
a stated wage (w)’ (ibid.: 294). Hence, W accepts authority in a specific area of acceptance.
Simon (1951) thus writes:
We will say that B exercises authority over W if W permits B to select x [an element of
the set of all possible behavior patterns]. That is, W accepts authority when his behavior
is determined by B’s decision. In general, W will accept authority only if x0, the x
chosen by B, is restricted to some given subset (W’s area of acceptance) of all the
possible value. This is the definition of authority that is most generally employed in
modern administrative theory (ibid.).
31 However, only the obligatory legal content allows the analysis of the area of this zone by
fixing it in law (Ray 2000). This is why an employer cannot demand employees to work
and provide productive tasks beyond the initial employment contract (notably because
the  criterion  of  employee  qualifications  and  performances  is  central  in  French
employment  contract).  Because  the  area  of  the  acceptance  zone  depends  on  this
qualification, the employer cannot modify it without the consent of the employee. The
judicial law concerning the procedure of modifications of the employment contract –
which has remained the explicit approbation of the employee since 1987 – is consistent
with Williamson’s perspective (see Williamson 1985, 1991, 2002).
32 Furthermore,  the  employee must  submit  to  the  judicial  power of  the  employer.  The
employer has the ability to impose the rules on the employee, as he is the instigator.
Labor laws thus recognize a form of implicit contract and of ‘auto-administration of the
firm’  (Pélissier,  Supiot  and Jeammaud 2006).  More specifically,  we can observe three
forms of power in employers, namely, the direction power, the normative power and the
sanctioning power (Jeammaud 2008).
33 The direction power refers to the power of economic (and management) direction, which
confers  to  the  employer  the  right  to  make  choices  of  creation,  suppression  and
transformation  of  productive  activities  and  of  implementation  and  organization  of
production  processes.  The  direction  power  is  also  related  to  the  power  of  directing
individuals, which gives the employer the right to recruit an employee, to assign him to a
precise  task  or  work  station,  to  fix  his  remuneration,  to  manage  and  control  the
execution of his work and to unseat the employee from the productive activity.  This
prerogative is one aspect of the power that each owner obtains from article 544 of the
French civil code (Code Civil), which governs the access conditions of the owner to his
asset and the conditions of its use by others. The French civil code affirms that ownership
is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used
in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations. In this view, the treatment of ownership is not
fundamentally different in the sense that ownership may also give de jure power in the
French  legal  system.  The  normative  power  refers  to  the  rules  implemented  by  the
employer himself. These rules are called ‘the employers’ untitled rules’ and concern, for
example,  the  awarding  of  primes,  the  modes  and the  criteria  of  the  evaluation  and
promotion of the workforce, among other factors. Finally, the sanctioning power is linked
to the right of the employer to take sanctions toward employees making professional
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faults.  Among  these  sanctions  are  official  warnings,  punitive  layoffs,  and  dismissals,
among others.
34 From this perspective, the analysis of power proposed by MTPR appears to be coherent
with French law. However, if the legal order confers to the employer the power of making
decisions aiming to or influencing the employee who must accept them, we note that the
French labor code (Code du Travail) does not formally recognize this form of authority.
The legal prerogatives constituted by the employers’ powers result from the combination
of different rights by which the control of production methods and the undisputable rule
of the employee-employer subordination relationship are ensured. The French notion of
contrat de travail is directly related to the notion of subordination in which the duty of
obedience is accepted in return for the absorption by the firm of a range of social risks.
35 The combination of the contractual freedom with the employers’ powers resulting from
the ownership of non-human assets (the de jure power of Rajan and Zingales, 2000), which
is  the  main  characteristic  of  the  non-organized  firm,  is  central  for  the  contract
economists of the firm in terms of the efficiency of the employment relationship. Indeed,
the employer is thus able to implement via contracts the incentive devices previously
mentioned. The objectives of these contracts are to force the employee to achieve the
highest level  of  effort  (see supra).  Although the power of  the employer is  taken into
account by contract economists, it appears that, according to these economic approaches,
the protection of employees should not come from law but from market mechanisms.
Indeed, some market mechanisms are able to reduce the potential opportunistic behavior
of the employer, who would be tempted to exploit the employees by not respecting his (ex
ante) commitments.
36 Several market mechanisms have been analyzed by contract economic theories to address
this problem of the non-enforcement of the contract. The more important mechanism is
reputation (see Williamson 1985; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2001; Hart and Holmström
2010). The reputation of a firm is derived from the way in which it pays employees and
constitutes an incentive to behave honestly with the employees. As a result, a firm that
exhibits opportunistic behavior (such as underpaying workers) will face difficulties in the
long term in recruiting new employees and/or will see the more efficient employees leave
(which is costly). A second important market mechanism underlined by Williamson is
based  on  the  potential  actions  used  by  the  employees  to  thwart  the opportunistic
employer. In fact, employees are not really without recourse and can act in a way that
penalizes their employer by choosing perfunctory cooperation to the detriment of the
consummate productive cooperation. Therefore, employees also have power within the
organization.  In his 1985 book,  Williamson notes that ‘incumbent employees who are
forced to accept inferior terms can adjust quality to the disadvantage of a predatory
employer’ (1985: 262). Beyond the market mechanisms, unions’ actions and the process of
collective negotiation can be used to combat employers’ opportunism.
 
2.1.2. Collective negotiation and convention: the efficiency of the labor collective
relationships in the organized firm
37 Beyond individual employment contracts and the de jure power, the sources of the French
labor  law include  collective  negotiation.  This  is  a  procedure  likely  to  be  used  with
agreements  endowed  with  normative  effects,  called  collective  agreements  or
conventions. The particularity of these agreements is that they apply in a systematic way
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to  individual  contracts  and  employment  relationships  and  thus  without  mediation
because the wills of the concerned parties do not matter.
38 The  procedures  of  collective  agreements  refer  to  the  collective  conventions  of  the
organized  American  firm.  Therefore,  we  also  observe  the  double  nature  of  the
employment contract  as  both an authentic  contract  and an institutional  act  (un acte
condition) in both French and American labor law. The latter refers to the non-contractual
situation of the employee in the institutional context of work (as in the Williamsonian
analysis),  whereas the former refers to the contractual dimension of the employment
relationship between an employer and an employee. In these conditions, for the lawyer,
the employee is both the co-contracting party of the employer and the member of the
workforce. In other words, beyond the ‘will agreement’, the employment contract (and
thus  the  ‘access’  to  a  new  firm)  allocates  a  particular  position  to  the  employee  by
prompting the application of a set of arrangements independently of the express will of
the contract parties. This is the case for the institutional arrangements emanating from
State regulations such as hygiene and safety and also for the arrangements resulting from
collective conventions (see Supiot 2009). These conventions state the minimum amount
of  remuneration,  the  classification  grid  and  the  work  time.  Furthermore,  collective
conventions are both an automatic effect and an imperative effect such that they are
imposed on all individual employment contracts. In addition to employment contracts
and  employers’  powers,  collective  conventions  constitute  an  integrated  part  of  the
governance of employment relationships.16
39 In other words, the normative dimension of the Williamsonian analysis of the internal
organization of the firm and of private ordering appears to be in line with the French
case. On different occasions, Williamson focused on the superiority of the legal model of
industrial  pluralism (see  Shulman 1955;  Cox 1958;  Summers  1969)  –  and notably  the
process of collective negotiation between employers and unions – compared with the
model of legal centralism.
40 First, Williamson suggests that giving unions the control of conflicts between individuals
promotes the group’s interests to the detriment of individual interests. This argument is
complementary to those he uses to justify the efficiency of the process of arbitration in
comparison with the legal procedure (see infra the discussion on disputes). In this view,
Williamson (1975)  quotes  the  work  of  the  lawyer  Cox  (1958),  for  whom allowing  an
individual  to  engage  in  the  procedure  of  arbitration  would  discourage  the  on-going
cooperation between the employer and the employee. For Williamson (1985), collective
negotiation with unions is a strong condition of ‘efficiency’ (1985: 254) in two ways. On
one  hand,  unions  have  a  role  as  ‘agents’  in  terms  of  information  on  employees’
preferences. On the other hand, unions have the objective of governance. That is, they
must ensure the continuity of the relationship between the employer and his employees
when specific human capital is engaged in the relationship. Unions are also important in
the moderation of increasing the wages of employees, which could penalize the economic
durability of the firm. Finally, by means of collective negotiation, the firm implements a
real internal market of labor endowed with institutionalized and explicit rules, notably in
terms of the wage grid17 and with a promotion system that contributes to efficiency by
encouraging cooperative behavior from both employees and employers, who have the
common interest of continuing the relationship.
41 In  summary,  the model  of  industrial  pluralism is  considered a  good system of  labor
relationship  insofar  as  it  is  a  ‘proposed’  model  and  not  an  ‘imposed’  model  that
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establishes  the  autonomy  of  the  firm,  which  is  in  accordance  with  the  contractual
tradition  of  the  United  States  (Blanc-Jouvan  2005:  156).18 More  generally,  contract
economic analysis, which is strongly influenced by British and American classical-liberal
philosophy,  analyzes  individual  or  collective  contracts  as  the  expression  of  the
contractual will of the free, equal and responsible contractors in the case of the organized
firm. Because the contract is the result of individual freedoms, legislators and judges do
not interfere with its formation or its content. However, not all the arrangements of the
French labor law adhere to this model. On the contrary, it seems that contract economic
theories are clearly incompatible with the positive labor law of the French legal system.
 
2.2. The importance of both the State and law courts (judges) in the
French legal structure of labor relationships: a major inconsistency
with contract economic theories
42 As  Supiot  (2010a)  writes,  ‘a  contract  only  makes  sense  if  the  parties  it  binds  have
concluded it under the auspices of some higher authority that can guarantee they will
keep their word (e.g., the gods, the king or the State). In the absence of such a guarantor,
the contract will be no more than an expression of the will of the strongest party’ (2010a:
152). In terms of employment protection law, this higher authority plays a central role in
France.  In  this  view,  contract  economic  theories  cannot  be  expressly  applied  to  the
French system of employment relationship regulation because of two major differences
with the American labor law: (1) the supervision of employers’ powers by the State and
law courts (judges) and (2) the legal settlement of conflicts and disputes.
43 American labor law is a law of the firm and for the firm, but the labor law in France is
significantly different. Supiot (2009) explains that the French model of labor law is based
on a ‘political conception’ of employment relationships, which are ‘dominated’ by State
intervention. We believe that two characteristics of the French model are incompatible
with a  strictly  contractual  analysis.  These two characteristics,  which result  from the
crucial role of the State, are the State’s fixing of a set of individual rights that concern all
the  employees  and  the  role  of  the  judge  in  the  administration  of  employment
relationships.
44 French labor law was and still is dominated by the intervention of the State, whose laws
and rules aim to impose a ‘balance’ in the employment relationship. Among these laws
and rules, we find the implementation of a legal structure supervising the exercise of
employers’  powers.  Although they are considered contractual  relationships of  private
law, the employment relationships are submitted to rules emanating from the public
order aiming to protect the weaker party of the contract. The role of the State is also
important in the settlement of disputes. More generally, the role of the judge is essential
in the French labor law (in contrast to the American labor law). Although employer –
notably in the non-organized firms – has a large latitude in the management of ‘his’ firm
in the United States, this is not the case in France, where the conception of the employer
as a ‘judge’ does not correspond to the reality of the law courts (Waquet 1996).
45 In contrast to the at-will  doctrine, French labor law has traditionally used the unfair
contract terms and the abuse of right doctrine, in particular with regard to the regulation
of  alternative  employment  contracts.  French law is  characterized  by  a  high  level  of
aggregate protection compared to the USA. Similarly, breaking an employment contract
comes under the strict control of the judge (notably in accordance with a law passed on
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13 July 1973 that invites the judge to verify the reality and the seriousness of the grounds
used by the employers in the dismissal letter, see Glendon 1984). The role of the judge is
also imperative in terms of the control of the disciplinary, regulatory and management
powers of the employer. Indeed, the judge must control social plans and avoid or limit
dismissals. Dismissal for economic reasons is thus under the judicial field and the control
of the judge – notably the French Cassation Court.  Furthermore,  some clauses of the
employment contract are subjects of particular attention for judges. This is the case for
the clauses that give the employer the ability to blame the employees whose productive
‘results’ do not strictly respect the contractual conditions in order to avoid cases in which
the employer transfers economic risks to the employees.  The failure of employees to
achieve  contractual  objectives  can be  a  cause  of  dismissal  only  if  the  two following
conditions are met: (1) the objectives must be realistic and suitable with the professional
skills and competences of the employee and (2) the employee who has not achieved his
objectives has made a specified fault.
46 From another perspective, we want to underline the fact that the fixing and the evolution
of  the  remuneration,  which  represent  an  important  subject  of  attention  for  the
economists  interested in incentive mechanisms,  are not  based on a  pure contractual
procedure of  the (free)  contractors.  French jurisprudence has  been interested in the
variation clauses that allow the employer to substantially and unilaterally modify some
elements of the employment contract. The main risk is thus that the employer obtains,
due  to  the  contract,  the  unilateral  power  to  modify  these  fundamental  elements.
However,  the Cassation  Court  has  deemed  some  of  the  clauses  of  the  employment
contract to be void; an example of such a clause is one that allows the employer to modify
the  contractual  remuneration  of  the  employee.  Similarly,  the  procedure  of  wage
individualization  depends  on  justification  requirements.  If  the  employer  can  pay
employees differently, he must be able to justify these differences (Pélissier, Supiot and
Jeammaud 2006). Judges can even intervene to validate (or not) the lawful nature of the
remuneration systems based on the classification of employees in terms of their relative
performance.
47 Finally, the discretionary power of the employer is strictly supervised and circumscribed
such  that  if  the  employer  maintains  a  form  of  de  jure power  and  some  extended
prerogatives in the French labor law, he cannot act only in his own interest. In France,
jurisprudence has proclaimed the so-called ‘standard of the interest of the firm’ as the
main evaluation criterion of employers’ decisions. In other words, we observe a real and
important gap between the French labor law and the contract theories of the firm. The
same conclusion can be made regarding the regulation of disputes.
48 In terms of disputes and conflicts, in contrast to the American law that encourages a
procedure of ‘professional settlement’ of disputes, the French law advocates the legal
settlement of disputes, notably concerning individual disputes, through the prud’hommes
council (conseil des prud’hommes), which is an elective and joint court. This legal procedure
is explicitly opposed to the point of view of Williamson (1985), who justifies in different
occasions the superiority of arbitration and grievance procedures over the legal system of
judges and courts for settling disputes.
49 In this perspective, Williamson (2002, 2005) uses the work of the law theorist Galanter
(1981),  for  whom  ‘in  many  instances  the  participants  can  devise  more  satisfactory
solutions to their disputes than can professionals constrained to apply general rules on
the basis of limited knowledge of the dispute’ (1981: 4). In other words, in the case of
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economic transactions based on a perfectly identified good – the pure exchange model – a
court can be efficient for settling disputes and conflicts.  However,  in the case of the
employment relationship, courts are not efficient, according to Williamson (1991), who
thus justifies the economic interest of the contractual regime of the ‘forbearance law’
(1991: 276). On the one hand, the parties concerned by an internal dispute have superior
knowledge of the circumstances of the dispute. On the other hand, settling these disputes
through courts would reduce the efficiency and the integrity of the hierarchy. Arguably,
courts even refuse to judge certain intra-firm disputes that concern, for example, transfer
prices between divisions, delay questions or quality failure.
50 In  summary,  for  questions  of  contractual  freedom,  employers’  powers  and collective
negotiation, the normative conclusions emanating from the contract economists are a
priori consistent with the legal regime of French employment relationships. However, the
roles of the State and judges in their regulation constitute important differences. As a
consequence, the evaluation of the French labor law regarding the firm using a contract-
based approach amounts to an a priori ‘disqualification’ and disregards all the elements
that are not consistent with the American legal system. In other words, from a normative
point of  view,  it  would be preferable to abolish all  that goes beyond the contractual
structure in the case of NCT and MTPR and all that stems from the internal settlement
processes used to resolve disputes and conflicts in the case of TCE.
 
Conclusion
51 In  conclusion,  two  main  results  arise  from  this  analytical  paper.  On  one  hand,  the
contract economic theories of the firm and the employment relationship are explicitly or
implicitly similar to the institutional and legal environment regulating the employment
contracts in the United States. On the other hand – and this argument is complementary
to the first – these theories can only partially account for the central characteristics of
the  administration of  the  employment  relationship  in  France,  which is  very  specific
under  the country’s  labor  law.  It  is  thus  fundamental  to  ‘contextualize’  the national
institutions to avoid hasty generalizations.
52 Additionally, the distinction between a political model (the French case) and an economic
model (the United States case) has broader theoretical implications. Contract economic
theories develop a view of the firm that is closely linked to the definition of the firm as an
autonomous legal entity governed by its own internal rules – and not by external norms
(see Courtois-Champenois 2002). Similarly, the powers and the rights of the employer are
stronger in the United States as compared to France and the professional legal order is
clearly distinct from the State public order in the United States. All these elements seem
to be in line with the cultural and intellectual roots of contract economic theories, which
are  clearly  based  on  the  specific  institutional  and  legal  environment  of  the  US.  In
contrast, the incompleteness of contracts is clearly admitted by legislators in France and
different external norms and provisions aim at reducing this incompleteness. Similarly,
French legislators usually try to reduce the asymmetry of power between employer and
employee and to limit the discretionary decisions made by employers. Contract economic
theories do not seem to consider this balancing of power as important in the regulation of
the employment relationship as compared notably to the benefits of employment at-will
and pure private ordering.
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53 A salient implication of this paper is that contract economic theories do not have all the
analytical and conceptual ‘tools’ necessary to include the political dimension of capitalist
firms and to reconsider the effectiveness of  law.  The law and economics of  the firm
cannot be reduced to a question of economic efficiency. Additionally, as Supiot (2010a)
argues,  ‘the rule of law must be reinstated to end human subordination to economic
efficiency’  (2010a:  151).  Thus,  we agree with him when he writes  that  ‘the drive for
depoliticization  led  most  economists  to  abandon  the  learned  tradition  of  political
economy in favor of economic science’ (ibid.: 158). Such an assessment sheds a new light
on the real-world power relationships and places political economy at the centre of the
theory of the firm, notably because economic theories of the firm tend to ‘dominate’
corporate law and corporate governance regulation and appear to be responsible for
introducing the economic efficiency paradigm (for a complementary view, see Iacobucci
and Triantis 2007).
54 It  does  not  mean that  the economics  of  the firm is  hopelessly  compromised by this
assessment.  However,  we  think  that  these  contract  approaches  should  be
‘recontextualized’ in order to include institutional changes. Regulatory frameworks have
been  constructed  and  have  evolved  at  the  national  level.  Therefore  the  context  of
globalization  has  clearly  dismantled  these  frameworks.  Finally,  the  new institutional
theories  based on the assumption of  incomplete contracts  –  notably TCE –  have not
evolved  in  parallel  with  international  institutional  changes,  whereas  their  analytical
frameworks  are  supposed  to  be  based  on  the  role  of  institutional  environment  in
determining firm governance structures (see Furubotn and Richter 2005 [2000]).
55 Furthermore, one can question the current relevance of contract economic theories, as
for two decades some large transformations have substantially modified the economic
and legal characteristics of the employment relationship in both the United States and
France (Stone 2009; Supiot 2009). The main changes in the employment relationship are
related to the reappraisal of the internal labor markets, the decreasing weight of unions
(and  thus  the  reducing  number  of  collective  agreements  in  the  United  States),  the
decentralization of negotiations in France (agreements taken at the level of the firm), the
blurring of  the boundaries  between the work of  employees  and that  of  independent
contractors (see Morin 2005),  the increase in insecure jobs, new socioeconomic issues
(e.g., corporate social responsibility, struggles against discriminations and the search for
men/women equality) and human resource management practices (e.g., the management
by  competencies  model,  the  individualization  of  wages  and  the  merit-based
remuneration).
56 In view of these transformations, the law has evolved differently in the two countries
analyzed.  For  Stone  (2009),  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  law  in  the  United  States
represent  a  major  shift  in  the  role  of  employment  regulation  away  from  collective
bargaining inside the firm and toward the State19.  In France,  the evolution has been
opposite. Indeed, the law seems to step aside in favor of a stronger contractualization of
the employment relationship (Supiot 2010a). Under these conditions, we can conclude
that there exists a certain ‘convergence’ between the two national institutional and legal
environments, which requires new economic analyses of the employment relationship.
Indeed, the economic theories previously analyzed do not seem to be able to include or
deal with these fundamental transformations in institutional environments.
57 Under these conditions, none of the theories presented in this text offers a framework
that  corresponds  to  the  modern  transformations  experienced  by  firms  and  the
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employment relationship over the last thirty years, and more precisely the break-up of
the vertically integrated large firms and the development of new de facto hierarchies in
the network-firm (see Chassagnon 2011).  Two lines of  normative developments  for  a
reform of labor law could be envisaged. On the one hand, the relevant level of negotiation
is  no  longer  that  of  the  firm but  the  level  of  production  supply  chains  and  whole
networks as such, and that of the territories. On the other hand, in line with this first
innovating argument, we should consider the distribution of responsibilities and power
within  corporate  networks  as  real  social  and economic  units  (see  Chassagnon 2012).
Indeed, the latter give the possibility to those who control them to exercise economic de
facto power by outsourcing their responsibilities to other firms, and therefore to other
employees. As a conclusion the contractualist approaches developed in this article are not
‘equipped’  to face the legal  challenges of  new forms of business organizations in the
modern world-economy.
58 In summary, we note that the majority of the economic works we have presented in this
paper date from the 70s, 80s and 90s and since then have not been the object of new
analyses. For example, the seminal works of Williamson on the employment relationship
have never been ‘updated’ and seem to be effective only in the context of the Ford-era
business.  Thus,  we  should  question  the  ‘normative’  dimension  largely  advocated  by
contract economists and, notably, by TCE. How can we explain the reappraisal of the
internal  labor market  and thus the industrial  model of  the employment relationship
considered  by  Williamson  as  an  efficient  model  of  internal  organization?  New
developments  need  to  be  proposed  both  in  economics  and in  law to  reconsider  the
positive  dimension  of  the  employment  relationship  and  to  analyze  it  from the  new
international  institutional  environment.  In  this  positive  view,  it  is  also  necessary  to
analyze the politico-legal implications of the emergence of complex organizational forms
(which are not correctly explained by contract approaches) that allow employers to
exploit possibilities for the fragmentation of the legal form of the firm, notably in terms
of employment and collective legal responsibilities (see Chassagnon 2011, 2012). This is
also one of the theoretical implications resulting from this work; we leave this question
for future studies but it seems clear that it shows that the Declaration of Philadelphia,
which affirmed that ‘labor is not a commodity’ and called for ‘the extension of social
security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection’, is still
topical (see Supiot 2010b).
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NOTES
1. It is important to note that the institutional economics of Commons (1924, 1931) proposed to
consider the capitalist firm from an economic and legal perspective.
2. This approach defines the firm as a governance structure that is coordinated by a hierarchical
authority (Williamson 2002).  Williamson considers  authority as  the heart  of  the employment
relationship individuals have with the firm. Thus, Williamson embraces the premise of Coase’s
analysis, in which the employment relationship is a superior/subordinate relationship, and the
firm differs by nature from the market. For Williamson, the nature of authority is found at two
distinct and complementary levels. The legal rules, embedded in an institutional environment,
shape  a  legal  framework.  However,  contractors  have  the  latitude  to  modify  this  framework
according to their preferences and goals in order to implement the best governance structure,
that is, the best normative private ordering. Therefore, Williamson’s transaction cost economics
offers a better understanding of the internal organization of the firm when compared with the
two other contract theories described here.
3. This theory – also called ‘agency theory’ – considers that the nature of the firm is based on the
organization of a bundle of different contractual arrangements. A contract is the central modular
mechanism that is able to play both a coordinating and an incentive-providing role within and
between the firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 312) insist on the fact that ‘most organizations are
simply legal fictions,  which serve as a nexus of contracting relationships among individuals.’
Such a contractual analysis implies some sense of continuity between the firm and the market.
Contractual relations are the essence of firms and human beings are the parties to this nexus of
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contracts.  Individuals  exist  only  in  regard  to  the  contracts.  There  are  no  strict  ontological
differences between a contract and an organization because the organization should be seen as
contractual  arrangements  through  which  transactions  pass  smoothly.  The  firm  conceals  the
features of an efficient market.
4. This theory defines the firm as a collection of nonhuman assets and argues that firms arise
where market contractual relationships fail. The collection of assets’ view of the firm states that
the nature and boundaries of the firm are intimately correlated and explains the firm boundaries
in terms of the optimal allocation of asset ownership. The assets that are held by the firm form
the firm. The holder of the residual rights of control over the nonhuman assets in a coalition has
power over the human capital owners, who need nonhuman assets in order to be productive. The
firm becomes a single ‘owner’ and has the residual rights of control on the assets. The nonhuman
assets constitute the glue that keeps the firm together.  Without this glue,  the firm is ‘just a
phantom’ (Hart 1995: 57).
5. This fundamental distinction is notably valid in the USA, Canada and to some degree to many
other systems like in the United Kingdom.
6. The Mutatis  Mutandis labor law would be the equivalent of the French collective relations,
whereas the employment law would be the equivalent of the French law of individual relations.
7. The corresponding legal text is the National Labor Relations Act and the Wagner law, voted on
in 1935 and modified and completed several times, notably by the Taft-Hartley law of 1947. This
system functions under the control of the National Labor Relations Board.
8. A total of 99 % of collective conventions include a compromise clause.
9. Governance is defined as the implicit or explicit contractual structure in which transactions
work.
10. This is unlike French labor Law.
11. This  is  clearly  the  definition of  employment  relationship  proposed by  Coase  in  his  1937
article.
12. It is important to note that this measure does not result in notices of the termination of
employment contracts or in compensation. The United States is the only industrialized country
to have such a rule.
13. According to contract approaches, the employment at will leads to economic efficiency. In
this view, the crucial question of the effectiveness of rules is obscured. However, protective rules
of employees can also be considered as a way of economizing transaction costs (see Collins 1993).
14. In this paper, we do not discuss the international sources, which are within the competences
of international labor law and community law.
15. Nevertheless, we will show that the constraining structure of the exercise of the commanding
power of the employer differs strongly between France and the United States, even regarding the
definition of subordination. Associated with contractual power relationships in the United States,
the subordination relationship is based on the institution of the authority relationship in France.
See infra.
16. Two other elements of the governance of the employment relationship are the processes of
the defense of interests (unions’ actions, workforce representation) and public intervention (the
rules of hygiene and safety mentioned supra).
17. Williamson  (1975)  notes  that  ‘the  internal  labor  market  achieves  a  fundamental
transformation by shifting to a system where wage rates are attached mainly to jobs rather than
to workers’ (1975: 74).
18. We should add that because it  is  an agreement that is  freely made between two distinct
rational individuals, a contract does not strictly (a priori) contravene the interests of the involved
parties. Therefore, contracts represent a basic form of justice, as they cannot damage the initial
well-being of the contractors.
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19. Donna Kesselman (2007) notes that since the 1960s there has been a ‘revolution of rights’,
which has contributed to the introduction of the public regulation of the individual relationship
between the employee and his employer. This direct intervention by the federal state allowed the
allocation of social rights to employees not covered by collective agreements and to establish
new forms of control over work. On the other hand, over the last twenty years, more and more
states  have  adopted  laws  or  regulations  limiting  the  employer's  power  with  regard  to  the
dismissal of their employees ‘at will’.
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normative  perspective.  From  a  positive  perspective,  the  contract  approaches  to  the  firm  –
transaction cost economics, the nexus of contracts theory and the modern theory of property
rights – are similar to the tradition of American labor law. However, from a normative point of
view,  it  appears  that  if  contract  economic  theories  seem to be partially  in  line with certain
principles of the French labor law, there is a strong inconsistency between these approaches and
the role that the French legal system gives to the State and to the law courts (and judges).
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